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[F]or the case of two goods, one always has global stability. … Nevertheless, some 
queer things can happen even in this case.
 — David Gale (1963)
General equilibrium theory is a cornerstone of modern economics and our core 
account of the nature of competitive markets. The theory has usually been focused 
more on the existence and character of competitive equilibrium, however,  than on 
how, when, and why economies come to be in equilibrium. Given the computational 
and epistemic requirements for calculating a competitive equilibrium, it seems 
implausible that economic agents could ever “think” their way there. More likely, 
dynamic processes govern disequilibrium prices, guiding them toward or away from 
equilibria. Until and unless we understand these dynamic processes, it is difficult 
to assess general equilibrium theory’s usefulness for predicting and explaining the 
behavior of competitive markets.
On this front there has been no shortage of theory. Accounts of disequilibrium 
dynamics stretch back to Marie-Esprit-Léon Walras (1877), and the quest for a 
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satisfying theory was an active pursuit until the 1970s (e.g., Frank H. Hahn and 
Takashi Negishi 1962; Leonid Hurwicz, Roy Radner, and Stanley Reiter 1975; 
Hirofumi Uzawa 1962) when it died off arguably for want of empirical nourish-
ment.1 Modern observers have wondered whether existing theories of dynamics are 
empirically meaningful, given that they are typically founded on some variation of 
tatonnement, a centralized price adjustment mechanism that differs substantially 
from most naturally occurring markets. In a wide-ranging survey, Darrell Duffie 
and Hugo F. Sonnenschein (1989) conclude that because actual market prices are 
not determined by the tatonnement mechanism, “few would argue today that it is a 
useful way to select from Walrasian equilibria.”
Recently, laboratory research has stepped in to fill the empirical gap (e.g., Plott 
2000, 2001; Christopher M. Anderson et al. 2004, Masayoshi Hirota et al. 2005; 
Steven Gjerstad 2007), and findings have in fact been broadly supportive of Walras’s 
hypothesis that price dynamics are intimately related to, and driven by, a market’s 
excess demand.2 Moreover, this literature suggests that Walrasian notions of dynam-
ics and stability have predictive power, even in distinctly nontatonnement market 
institutions (virtually all of this literature uses the double auction institution).3
In this paper we provide a particularly strong test of the Walrasian hypothesis 
by experimentally studying a simple economy in which Walrasian dynamics pre-
dict highly implausible outcomes. In the Gale (1963) two-good exchange economy, 
Walrasian dynamics push disequilibrium prices of the nonnumeraire good away 
from an equitable (but unstable) interior competitive equilibrium toward infinity or 
zero. Disequilibrium price paths eventually induce agents on one side of the market 
to give goods away for free, along with all gains from trade, within one of a pair 
of corner equilibrium sets. Here, as in Thomas Balogh and Paul Streeten’s (1951, 
p. 75) memorable phrase, “the invisible hand does its work by strangulation.”4 
Remarkably, which side of the market gives away its goods depends not on struc-
tural parameters of the economy but purely on the market’s initial price and the 
dynamic path this price initiates. Powerful income effects generate positive excess 
demand (and upward price trajectories) at initial prices above the interior competi-
tive equilibrium and negative excess demand (and downward trajectories) below.
Gale’s economy provides an important stress test of the Walrasian hypothesis for 
two reasons. First, the extreme Walrasian predictions for this economy are intui-
tively implausible and have perplexed economists for decades,5 whereas interior 
1 This is a fact general equilibrium theorists sometimes lament (see, for example, Alan P. Kirman 1989).
2 Marshallian dynamics, where quantities adjust given differences between buyer and seller prices, have been 
found to be more successful in economies with negative externalities (see Plott and Glen George 1992), positive 
externalities, (Plott and Jared Smith 1999), and recently in an economy with continuous probabilistic market entry 
(Michael Alton and Plott 2007).
3 Although modern theorists frequently motivate tatonnement by describing a fictional centralized mechanism, 
Walras himself did not use such a mechanism to motivate his theory. In fact, Walras conceived of tatonnement as 
a theory regarding the process governing decentralized markets (see Donald A. Walker 1996). Thus, Walras would 
likely have been less surprised than modern observers to learn that tatonnement does a good job of anticipating the 
behavior of decentralized laboratory markets. We thank Omar Al-Ubaydli for pointing this out to us.
4 Gale’s example can be viewed as the limiting case of several well-known 2×2 economies with three competi-
tive equilibria, the earliest due to Alfred Marshall (1879). It is Marshall’s economy to which Balogh and Streeten 
refer.
5 Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu (1954, p. 269) assume that “impossible combinations of commodities, 
such as … the consumption of a bundle of commodities insufficient to maintain life, are regarded as excluded” from 
the feasible set of consumption bundles. John S. Chipman (1965, p. 730) infers from this passage that, “From this 
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equilibration and global instability are two highly appealing alternative hypotheses. 
Indeed, the economy is often used as a reductio ad absurdum, a cautionary tale con-
cerning the limits of aprioristic reasoning about markets. Chipman (1965) writes of 
the Gale example, “It is best to consider it as a sobering reminder that the pure theory 
admits of many strange possibilities that cannot be ruled out by a priori reasoning.” 
It is precisely the fact the Gale example is transparently “strange” (Chipman 1965), 
“queer” (Gale 1963), and implausible that makes it a limiting robustness test for 
Walrasian dynamics.
Second, the Gale example (unlike the similarly famous and previously studied 
three-good example of Herbert E. Scarf 1960) is a two-good economy that can be 
easily implemented in a single commodity double auction with an equal number 
of net buyers and net sellers. Price dynamics and their implications for each side 
of the market are utterly transparent, as participants need only pay attention to 
one price series to quickly understand the character of dynamics. One side of the 
market has both sufficient information and powerful incentives to resist Walrasian 
price trajectories.
This project began as a friendly debate among coauthors concerning the robustness 
of Anderson et al. (2004), which identified price cycles across periods in a labora-
tory implementation of Scarf’s example. A reasonable inference from this research 
is that, where they conflict, Walrasian dynamics are more important predictors of 
outcomes than the fixed points that lie at the heart of equilibrium economics. Two 
authors conjectured that given enough experience (here 13 or more trading periods 
per session, nearly double the number observed in Anderson et al.), large enough 
markets (10 subjects of each type, double the number per type in Anderson et al.), 
transparent enough dynamics (subjects can track dynamic trajectories by looking at 
only one price), and contemptible enough outcomes (in the Gale economy, half of 
the subjects’ earnings are devastated by dynamic trajectories), Walrasian dynamics 
would fail and criteria other than tatonnement would come to govern behavior. In 
particular, the two skeptics conjectured that resistance to tatonnement dynamics by 
the disadvantaged side of the market would lead the economy to settle in a neighbor-
hood of the equitable equilibrium, or produce signs of global instability instead of 
the clear trajectories of tatonnement.
The skeptical authors were proved wrong. We report robust evidence that prices 
in laboratory Gale economies resist the interior competitive equilibrium and march 
upward or downward toward the corner equilibria. In fact, prices became as high or 
as low as one could expect given the discreteness of the space of goods in the lab 
economy so that subjects on the “wrong” side of the market were left trading their 
entire allotment of goods for a few pennies. We also discover that dynamics, once 
seeded, are sticky and difficult to reverse.
A handful of earlier studies have shown emergent prices in partial equilibrium 
environments that disadvantage one side of the market (e.g., Vernon L. Smith 1965). 
What makes the Gale example curious is that the side of the market disadvantaged 
is not selected by structural features of the economy such as the number of traders, 
point of view, [the Gale corner solutions] do not qualify as equilibrium solutions, and the example becomes one 
of global instability,” before wryly observing, “It would certainly come as news to the inhabitants of many a poor 
country to learn that starvation had now become ‘impossible.’”
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or the basic character of supply and demand. Rather, the losing side is driven by 
something as seemingly arbitrary as the economy’s initial trading prices and the 
dynamics these initial prices set off. It is the inherently dynamic cause of extreme 
inequity and the existence of a reasonable alternative that makes the example so 
counterintuitive and the laboratory evidence supporting it compelling.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we review 
Walras’s theory of tatonnement, introduce our parameterization of a Gale economy, 
describe our experimental design, and lay out our primary experimental questions. 
In Section II we present results from our experiment. We conclude with a discussion 
of our results in Section III.
I. The Gale Example: Theory and Experimental Design
A. Walrasian Dynamics and the Gale Example
Tatonnement is the earliest and best known of the classical theories of market price 
dynamics. The process begins with an arbitrary vector of initial prices that induce 
a corresponding vector of excess demands. If a good is in excess demand, its price 
increases, while its price decreases if the good is in excess supply. This process is 
iterated indefinitely until excess demand for each good is zero and a competitive equi-
librium is reached. It is only in equilibrium that trades are actually executed and endow-
ments adjusted. Consider an economy with two commodities, x and y. Normalizing 
the price of y to one so that pt is the price of good x at time t, tatonnement adjustment 
in discrete time is given by the following difference equation:
(1)   p t+1 −  p t = f ( Z x  (  p t )),
where  Z x (  p t ) is the excess demand for good x given pt, and f is a sign preserving 
function of excess demand. A finite price  p * > 0 is a competitive equilibrium price 
if  Z x (  p * ) = 0. A competitive equilibrium price is locally stable if there exists ε > 0 
such that for all δ ≠ 0 where | δ |< ε, δ  Z x (  p * + δ ) < 0. A competitive equilibrium 
price is globally stable if δ  Z x (  p * + δ ) < 0 for all finite δ. Local and global instabil-
ity are defined similarly, but the δz( · ) conditions have opposite sign.6
We consider the variation on Gale’s (1963) economy represented by the Edgeworth 
box in panel A of Figure 1. The origin of agent 1’s coordinate axis is the lower-left 
corner of the Edgeworth box, while agent 2’s origin is the upper-right corner. Agent 
i has Leontief preferences
(2)  U i ( x i ,  y i ) = min { a i  x i  ,  y i +  b i }.
The ray y =  a i x −  b i  , x, y > 0, depicted in the Edgeworth box by the black line 
segment for agent 1 and the gray line segment for agent 2, is called the expansion 
6 Scarf (1960) provided a three-agent, three-good economy with a unique competitive equilibrium that is glob-
ally unstable under the basic tatonnement adjustment procedure; tatonnement prices converge to a limit cycle about 
the competitive equilibrium. Anderson et al. (2004) report that mean prices across periods track this limit cycle in 
a laboratory implementation of Scarf’s example.
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Figure 1. Edgeworth Box (A) and Net Supply and Demand Functions (B)
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path (a generalization of the offer curve) for agent i. It represents the set of positive 
consumption bundles at which the entire quantity of each good contributes to i’s 
utility (i.e., there are no wasted goods in bundles on this path).
Given endowment ( w i x ,  w i y ), agent i’s (interior) demand is determined by the 
intersection of her budget line at the prevailing price and the expansion path. It is 
straightforward to show that the demand functions are given by
  x i  *  ( p) =  p w i 
x +  w i y +  b i   __  a i + p  and  y i  *  ( p) =  
ai( p w i x +  w i y ) − p b i   __  a i + p  ,
and the excess demand for good x in the economy is
  Z x ( p) =   m 1  _  a 1 + p +  
 m 2  _  a 2 + p , where  m i =  w i y +  b i −  a i w i x .
Provided an interior competitive equilibrium exists, its associated price is
  p  *  = −  a 1 m 2 +  a 2 m 1   _  m 1 +  m 2   .
In Appendix A we derive these functions and show that the interior equilibrium is 
unstable if and only if m1 + m2 > 0.
In Figure 1 and our experiment we set  a 1 = 35.5,  b 1 = − 1,349,  a 2 = 658, 
and  b 2 = 3,947,7 with endowments( w 1 x,  w 1 y) = (15, 400) and ( w 2 x,  w 2 y) = (5, 
5600). These parameters generate an interior competitive equilibrium (ICE) price 
p  *  ≈ 158. Our laboratory implementation is discrete so the ICE is actually a cone 
p ∈[147, 172] emanating from the endowment allocation and centered on the conflu-
ence of the expansion paths (this cone is drawn with dotted lines in the Edgeworth 
box in panel A of Figure 1). Panel B of Figure 1 provides another view of the dis-
cretized economy, plotting net supply and demand functions of good x with respect 
to the endowment. Net supply and demand are equal within the ICE bounds, result-
ing in zero excess demand in the competitive price tunnel.
The ICE is interior, equitable (each party receives identical payoffs and gains 
from trade under our payoff scaling), and is defined by an excess demand of zero. It 
is globally unstable, however, under tatonnement. At prices higher than (clockwise 
from) the ICE price, agent 2’s demand for good x exceeds agent 1’s supply, generat-
ing positive excess demand and, by (1), causing prices to rise away from the ICE. At 
prices lower than (counter clockwise from) the ICE price the reverse is true and, by 
(1), prices will fall away from the ICE.
Walrasian dynamics drive adjustment until prices reach either zero or infinity8 
and can no longer adjust in the direction of excess demand. These prices are, by 
7 These are approximate; precise values are given in Appendix Section A.
8 In our discrete implementation of this economy, p ≥ 2,800 actually induces a stable “near corner” equilibrium 
where one unit of good x is exchanged.
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convention, competitive equilibrium prices, though of an odd form since excess 
demands are far from zero. These corner prices generate a range of allocations (we 
call them corner competitive equilibria, or CCE) that are (weakly) optimal but highly 
inequitable. In either CCE, one agent gives away some amount of a commodity to 
the other for free, along with all of the gains from trade. Which CCE is selected 
and which side of the market is disadvantaged in equilibrium depends entirely upon 
initial prices and the dynamics they ignite.9
B. Experimental Design and Procedures
In order to assess the empirical content of the extreme tatonnement predictions in 
Gale’s economy, we examined a series of discrete-good laboratory markets param-
eterized as above. In each of 8 sessions,10 between 12 and 20 subjects traded for 
approximately 3 hours. In each session, half of the subjects were assigned agent 1’s 
preferences and endowments and half agent 2’s, forming a replica of the economy 
described above.
9 In Appendix Section A we show how Gale’s example is simply the limiting case of constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) preferences with a utility bias for “home production” (that is, agents have a stronger relative 
preference for the good in which they are endowed in greater proportion to total resources). Thus, there is a family 
of smooth economies qualitatively similar to Gale’s example but where the “outer” equilibrium prices are strictly 
interior. By switching endowments (thus removing the utility bias for home production), such a CES economy 
becomes globally stable with a unique ICE. Gjerstad (2007) implements globally stable 2x2 CES economies in the 
lab and observes reliable convergence to the ICE.
10 There was also a pilot session using different utility parameters.
Figure 2. Total Predicted Earnings of Both Sides of the Market as a Function of Price
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Sessions were divided into a sequence of 13–15 trading periods each last-
ing 6–15 minutes. Period lengths within each session started high and were 
gradually decreased as subjects became more comfortable with the trading 
environment.11 Trade was conducted via computerized continuous double auc-
tion using MarketScape software, and traders bought and sold units of x using the 
numeraire y as the medium of exchange. Subjects tracked their potential earnings 
using a special graphical program implemented in Excel that allowed them to visu-
alize their induced indifference curves and expansion paths and quickly calculate 
the payoff consequences of prospective trades. Screenshots of these programs are 
presented and discussed in online Appendix C.
As with most market experiments, implementation was via stationary repetition. At 
the end of each period subjects earned cash payments (paid at the end of the session) 
based on their ending allocations, and induced utility functions and allocations were 
returned to endowment levels for the next period of trade. Stationary repetition is espe-
cially useful in our study because tatonnement dynamics assume price adjustments at 
a fixed endowment. By resetting endowments at the beginning of each period, we can 
neatly map Walrasian predictions onto the sequence of period average prices.
The session design is summarized in Table 1. Each session opened with a block of 
periods we call the primary phase. In half of the sessions we allowed primary phase 
prices to initiate freely. We call these primary-free sessions. In the other half we con-
trolled the sign of initial excess demand using price controls; we call these primary-
control sessions. Following the primary phase we attempted to reverse observed price 
dynamics by switching the sign of the market’s excess demand using price controls. 
We refer to this later block of periods as the reversal phase. The period in which we 
began the reversal phase was triggered by a determination of price convergence. In 
several sessions, time permitting, we lifted price controls in the final period of the 
reversal phase. In the price control columns of Table 1, we specify what types of price 
controls were implemented and in which periods. So, for example, in the primary 
phase of session 6 a price floor above the ICE was imposed during periods 1–7 and 
was lifted during periods 8 and 9. During the reversal phase, a price ceiling below the 
ICE was imposed during periods 10–14 and lifted in period 15.
Subjects received extensive training and instruction prior to trading. Instructions 
concerning both the character of preferences and the details of the MarketScape 
interface were distributed and read aloud to subjects; these instructions are included 
in online Appendix C. After reading instructions, subjects engaged in a period of 
paid trade at a fixed price, allowing them to learn how to calculate earnings and 
submit orders without being allowed to engage in the strategy of setting prices. This 
gave them experience with their induced preferences and with the mechanics of the 
double auction.12
11 Specifically, there was a paid training period of 15 minutes at prespecified prices. The first “real” period was 
15 minutes long, the second 12 minutes, the third 10 minutes, the fourth 8 minutes, and the rest 6 minutes.
12 We varied the training period price from session to session; this price was 120 in session 1, 90 in sessions 2–4, 
and 275 in sessions 5–8. Thus, half of the training prices were initiated in a region of negative excess demand, the 
other half in a region of positive excess demand. While the training price may potentially influence the initial prices 
in period 1, our objective is to study the evolution of prices over time, wherever they happen to start; disequilibrium 
theory is generally silent on where initial prices come from. In fact, the sign of excess demand at training prices was 
a poor predictor of the sign of excess demand at subsequent period 1 prices, as two of four primary-free sessions 
immediately exited the signed region of excess demand in which they were trained.
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We chose parameters to achieve several goals. First, to allow only discrete trades 
while maintaining a sufficiently fine price grid, the numeraire good y is scaled 
to a much larger number of units than the commodity good x—a conventional 
 normalization of the Edgeworth box in general equilibrium experiments. We also 
included an additive constant in the induced utility function (not in Gale’s original 
economy) that allows us to keep the volume of orders reasonably low while main-
taining a relatively narrow ICE price tunnel. Economies with lower trading volumes 
take less time to clear than economies with higher volumes, allowing us to run 
shorter (and thus more) periods.
We adopted a nonlinear, monotone-increasing exchange rate from induced utils 
(that is, Ui (xi , yi) in (2)) to dollars in order to equalize total payoffs at all three 
equilibria and create symmetry in relative inequality at the two corner equilibria. 
The map from price to profit is shown in Figure 2. At the ICE price of 158 (and cor-
responding ICE allocation), subjects of both types earn $3 per period. At her “good” 
(“bad”) corner equilibrium a subject of either type earns $5 ($1). As is clear from 
Figure 2, there is a rough symmetry between the two subject types with respect 
to the marginal impact of price changes on profits, so that any price change is an 
approximately zero sum transfer from one subject type to the other. If our util-to-
dollar exchange rate had instead been linear and, for example, we had normalized 
the ICE and “bad” CCE payments to be $3 and $1 per period, respectively, then the 
p = 0 CCE payment for type 2 agents (their “good” equilibrium) would equal only 
$3.57. Thus, incentives for these subjects would have been low relative to type 1 
subjects for prices below the ICE range (the same holds true for type 1 agents in the 
high-price CCE).
C. Experimental Questions
Our design permits investigation of four main questions. The first is whether the 
interior competitive equilibrium range is behaviorally stable. When prices are in the 
ICE, do they stay there? Do prices outside of the ICE move toward the ICE over 
time? The former is a measure zero event in the continuous economy if the initial 
price is drawn from a continuous distribution, but of practical interest in our discrete 
implementation. The latter seeks to identify expressly anti-tatonnement dynamics, 
where prices move opposite the sign of excess demand.
Question 1: Is the interior CE behaviorally stable?
Table 1—Summary of Session Design
Primary phase Reversal phase
Session Market size Price control Free prices Price control Free prices
1 12 1–14
2 20 1–9  Ceiling: 10–12 13
3 20   Ceiling: 1–4 5–8    Floor: 9–14
4 20   Ceiling: 1–11 12  Ceiling: 13–14
5 20     Floor: 1–8 9  Ceiling: 10–14
6 20     Floor: 1–7 8–9  Ceiling: 10–14 15
7 20 1–5  Ceiling: 6–14 15
8 16 1-4  Ceiling: 5–13
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If the ICE is unstable in the sense that prices are not drawn to it, it is still possible 
that prices show signs of global instability by failing to follow a clear trajectory. Our 
second question is, therefore, whether there is a strong (and direct)  correspondence 
between the sign of excess demand and the direction of period-to-period price 
adjustments as tatonnement predicts.
Question 2: Are price dynamics Walrasian?
Even if prices move in a relatively orderly fashion toward the corner competitive 
equilibria, it is possible they could stabilize in a neighborhood “far” from CCE 
prices. It is the prediction of corner convergence that seems most implausible ex 
Figure 3. Price Series from Sessions 1–4 
Notes: Vertical lines demarcate periods and horizontal dotted lines show ICE bounds. Arrows ending in horizontal 
gray dashed lines designate price controls.
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ante; thus, our third question is whether this implausible prediction bears out in 
the data.
Question 3: Do prices reach corner equilibria and are these equilibria behaviorally 
stable?
We answer the preceding three questions using the primary phase data. Our final 
question is whether we can actually reverse the trajectory of prices by exogenously 
changing excess demand. An alternative hypothesis is that primary dynamics, once 
established, are sticky.
Question 4: Can primary phase price dynamics be reversed?
II. Results
A. Primary Dynamics
Figures 3 and 4 display transaction prices from each session of the experiment. 
Periods are separated by vertical gray lines, phases by vertical black lines, and the 
ICE bounds are demarcated by horizontal dotted lines. Dashed lines at the end of 
arrows represent price controls (downward arrows are price ceilings, upward arrows 
price floors). We focus on the primary phase dynamics and later consider the rever-
sal phase.
In session 1, early first period transactions are within or very near the ICE bounds, 
and prices stay centered there for the remainder of the session. In every other ses-
sion, prices begin outside the ICE and never enter its bounds (one early transac-
tion in session 2 notwithstanding). Indeed, as we’ll confirm below, Primary prices 
always trend away from the ICE from period to period. When prices initiate above 
the ICE, they explode to an order of magnitude above it; when they initiate below, 
prices collapse to nearly (and sometimes exactly) zero. Prices within period also 
show a systematic tendency away from the ICE. These tendencies match Walrasian 
predictions as prices above the ICE generate positive excess demand and prices 
below negative excess demand. These observations answer our first question and 
provide us with our first result.
RESULT 1: The interior competitive equilibrium is behaviorally unstable. When 
prices initiate inside the ICE they stay there. When they initiate outside the ICE they 
show no systematic tendencies toward it over time.
Free session excess demand is endogenous, making it difficult to be sure it is 
causally related to price movements. Prices that initiate at positive excess demand 
also initiate high; perhaps the climbing prices we observe in free sessions reflect a 
dynamic tendency that codetermines initial price and the price gradient. It is pos-
sible that excess demand is not in fact causally related to excess demand.
To better identify the relationship between excess demand and price, we 
exogenously controlled and varied initial excess demand in half of our sessions 
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(sessions 3, 4, 5, and 6).13 In sessions 5 and 6 we used price floors in the first few 
periods to force excess demand at initial prices to be positive. In sessions 3 and 4 we 
forced prices to initiate with negative excess demand using price ceilings. Dynamics 
in these sessions are also Walrasian; sessions with price ceilings below the CE have 
prices dropping toward zero, while sessions with price floors above the CE have 
prices that rise far above the ICE bounds. Moreover, in each of these sessions we 
lifted price controls, and prices continued both between and within period on their 
13 Several previous experiments employ price controls to influence the sign of excess demand (e.g., Plott and 
George 1992; Plott 2000). To our knowledge, however, Omar Al-Ubaydli , John A. List, and Michael K. Price 
(2010) are the first to point out and seriously consider identification issues associated with experimental price 
dynamics. While we use price controls to overcome endogeneity, they employ a clever and considerably subtler 
instrument in a series of partial equilibrium markets.
Figure 4. Prices from Sessions 5–8
Notes: Vertical lines demarcate periods and horizontal dotted lines show ICE bounds. Arrows ending in horizontal 
gray dashed lines designate price controls.
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original trajectories, sometimes after a brief but unsuccessful surge in the opposite 
 direction.14 Via exogenous treatment variation we are able to infer that dynamics 
are, in fact, caused by excess demand.
To test the Walrasian hypothesis more formally we calculate, for each session, 
the Mann-Kendall τ ∈ [−1, 1], an ordinal, nonparametric measure of trend, for 
weighted average price across periods.15 In sessions in which initial weighted aver-
age prices are at positive excess demand τ is nearly 1, indicating strong positive 
price trend, while in sessions with negative excess demand, τ is close to −1. These 
measures are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level in sessions 2–7. 
In session 8, τ is very close to 1 (0.999), but the small number of primary periods 
allows us confidence at only the 10 percent level. These statistics generate our 
second result.
RESULT 2: Primary disequilibrium price dynamics are Walrasian. From period to 
period, prices move significantly in the direction of the sign of excess demand.
Within period, endowments adjust at each transaction price in the double auc-
tion so theoretical models of price dynamics within periods are difficult at best. 
For example, tatonnement models typically assume stationary endowments. None-
theless, in Figures 3 and 4 the trend in prices within period is obvious: under positive 
excess demand, prices virtually always rise within period, and under negative excess 
demand they nearly always fall.
To check this more formally, we calculate the Mann-Kendall τ for prices and time 
within period for each disequilibrium period in the primary phase. In all primary 
phase periods but one (period 9 of session 6) we observe significant trend within 
period.
In these periods with significant trend, prices universally match excess demand 
at both the current and previous average price. We document this as a further result.
RESULT 3: The sign of disequilibrium price movements within period matches the 
sign of excess demand.
Although there is clear evidence that tatonnement gets the sign right, there is little 
evidence in our data of a relationship between the magnitude (of the absolute value) 
of excess demand and the size of price changes.16 This reflects the challenge to 
theory presented by Gale economies with parameters such as ours. Excess demand 
(or supply) increases as the economy moves toward corner equilibria. As the econ-
omy approaches equilibrium, however, incentives to trade begin to evaporate. These 
slowdowns could have the effect of dampening price changes at high excess demand 
14 In fact, these brief surges provide particularly strong tests of Walrasian dynamics “near” the CCE; the lifting 
of the price control is used by some subjects as a device to coordinate on antitatonnement pricing. These resistance 
attempts universally fail and end up being very short-lived, as they are quickly overpowered by Walrasian forces.
15 Similar results obtain using cardinal correlation measures such as Pearson’s ρ. In online Appendix B we report 
parametric tests of price dynamics, both within and between period, using standard panel data techniques, and find 
similar results.
16 An econometric analysis of the relationship between excess demand and price movements between periods is 
provided in online Appendix B. See also Hirota et al. (2005) for similar findings in laboratory Scarf economies. They 
do find quantitative relationships but the dynamics become complicated by the multiple market setting they study.
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(or supply) and may make it difficult to observe any latent magnitude effects. It 
seems that the very features of the Gale example that generate its extreme predic-
tions also make it a challenging arena for understanding the structural relationship 
between price changes and excess demand.17
B. Convergence and Reversal
Disequilibrium prices show a strong tendency away from the interior equilibrium 
and toward the corner equilibria. How close to the corner equilibria do our markets 
come?
Our restriction of trade to the integer grid actually implies finite p ≥ 2,800 are 
competitive equilibrium prices, where each type 2 (1) subject buys (sells) one unit 
of x. In such equilibria the payoff to each type 2 (1) subject is $1.07 ($4.68); recall 
that subjects earn $1 each at their endowments, so type 2 subjects are very nearly 
supplying good y for free. Thus prices of p ≥ 2,800 would certainly suggest “cor-
ner” prices.
But consider optimal symmetric (by type) trade at a price less than 2,800 but still 
“large.” For p ≥ 1,446 the profit of each type 1 subject is $4.68, the same as in the 
(discrete) “corner” equilibrium (see Figure 3). Therefore, there should be no pres-
sure from the supply side for prices to go any higher. At p = 1,446, however, the 
type 1 subjects supply one unit of x each while the type 2 subjects demand three 
units, so there is substantial excess demand.
How salient is this excess demand? When p = 1,446, if the demand of a type 2 
subject were fulfilled she would earn $1.28, but under optimal symmetric trade (so 
that she is able to acquire only 1 unit of x) she earns $1.07. Therefore, the excess 
demand is worth $0.21. Since symmetric optimal profits are constant for p ≥ 1,446 
and excess demand is worth a fairly small amount ($2–$3 over the course of an 
entire session), p = 1,446 seems like a natural benchmark for convergence to a 
near-corner price (and 7 cents a benchmark corner trading profit for a price-disad-
vantaged subject). It is worth noting that the “demanded” profit for type 2 subjects 
shrinks steadily as prices increase in the interval p ∈ [1446, 1643], above which a 
type 2 subject demands profit of $1.16 for all p ∈ [1,643,  2,494] (so excess demand 
is worth only $0.09 in this interval) before again declining toward $1.07. Given 
this wide band (in prices) of profit nonmonotonicity with such small “lost” profit 
attached to excess demand, p ≥ 1,643 is practically an equilibrium price.
By comparison, the payoff gradient on the price path to the p = 0 equilibrium is 
relatively smooth. For symmetry we consider the lower-near-corner range to be any 
price that yields trading profit of 7 cents or less to the type 1 subjects; this is true at 
any p ≤ 19.
Figure 5 plots end-of-period prices (weighted average transaction price during 
the final minute of the period) for each session-phase combination. For visibility 
across vastly different scales, the data are divided into a panel for periods initiating 
17 Gjerstad (2007) studies a laboratory economy that does not have this feature of the Gale economy and thus 
manages to get a clear picture of the parameters in that environment. He estimates parameters governing both 
tatonnement (between period) and Hahn and Negishi (within period) processes and finds strong support for mag-
nitude effects.
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with positive excess demand and a separate panel for periods initiating with  negative 
excess demand. Primary dynamics are plotted in black, price control periods are 
linked by solid lines, while free periods are linked by dotted lines. Horizontal black 
lines show the bounds for our near-corner prices both on the high and low end. In 
all seven disequilibrium sessions we observe prices entering this range by the end 
of the primary phase. Mean prices therefore reach levels extremely close in payoff 
space to CCE prices.
RESULT 4: Prices converge to close neighborhoods of corner competitive equilib-
rium prices.
It is important to consider measures of corner equilibration other than price con-
vergence. Convergent prices are useful, but unavoidably conceal heterogeneity 
inherent in the double auction institution that particularly matters in general equi-
librium settings. Double auction markets are cleared, not at a single price within 
period, but at a host of prices evolving over the period’s duration. Moreover, sub-
jects need not submit optimal demands at each transaction price. Indeed, it is typical 
to observe individual subjects making multiple trades at multiple prices over the 
course of a single period.
We can sidestep these problems by directly studying the final allocations achieved 
by the market; how “close” are these allocations to corner equilibrium allocations? 
Figure 5. End-of-Period Prices by Session
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A simple metric of linear distance in the Edgeworth box is of limited value because 
of the highly nonlinear nature of rewards in this space, because there is a large set of 
equilibrium allocations from which to benchmark distance, and because allocations 
are restricted to a discrete grid (meaning both that a range of prices typically sup-
ports identical levels of demand and supply and that a single price tick can imply a 
discrete jump in excess demand). An appealing alternative is to examine inequality 
across player types in the achieved gains from trade (relative to the endowment), a 
one-dimensional measure that is increasing as allocations move from the ICE toward 
either CCE.18 This measure is also a particularly strong test of corner convergence 
in that it measures the aspect of the corner equilibria that seemed least plausible, ex 
ante.
For each period, we calculate the share of total gains from trade achieved by the 
type 1 side of the market. At the upper corner (for p ≥ 1,446) the benchmark sym-
metric optimal measure is 0.981 while at the lower corner (for p = 19) it is 0.019. 
In Figure 6 we plot these benchmarks as dashed horizontal lines. We also include the 
symmetric optimal benchmark gains in the ICE in shaded gray.
For each session and period we plot the evolution of type 1’s average share of the 
earnings, with a separate panel for the primary and reversal phases. Primary phase 
results are compelling. In session 1, where prices initiate and remain in the ICE 
tunnel, gains from trade are nearly evenly split. In all disequilibrium periods prices 
move decisively19 away from an even split, generally ending with one side of the 
market earning in excess of 95 percent of the gains from trade. These shares come 
very close to those obtaining at corner equilibria.20
RESULT 5: out-of-equilibrium dynamics lead one side of the market to capture 
nearly all gains from trade, eventually more than 20 times that of the other side. 
These divisions are close to those predicted at corner equilibria.
Primary phase data converged quickly,21 so in sessions 2–8 we attempted to 
reverse the dynamics, using price controls to switch the sign of excess demand. 
The results of this effort were mixed, and our data, though preliminary, suggest that 
dynamics are sticky once seeded. In sessions 5 and 6 prices do drop substantially 
over time in an apparent successful reversal, while in sessions 3, 7, and 8 they con-
sistently hug the price constraint (in 2 and 4 there are too few data to make a call). In 
three sessions (2, 6, and 7) we eventually lifted the constraint and in each case prices 
18 Note that total gains from trade vary little at optimal or near optimal demands in our parameterization of the 
Gale economy; the main effect of a change in price on payoffs is in relative shares of the gains from trade earned by 
each side of the market. Online Appendix B presents plots showing flat total gains from period to period.
19 In session 3 there is a temporary spike toward equity when price controls are relaxed, but shares quickly plum-
met back toward zero.
20 Note that although earnings shares change dramatically over the course of sessions, total realized payoffs 
hardly change at all. Earnings are, moreover, very close to predicted levels, indicating markets are relatively effi-
cient in that subjects typically extract nearly all of the gains from trade. Details are provided in online Appendix B.
21 Though in online Appendix B we provide suggestive evidence that prices had generally not yet finished mov-
ing by the close of the primary phase and likely would have continued to move away from the ICE had we extended 
the duration of the primary phase with additional periods.
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leapt past the ICE, returning to their primary phase trajectories (see the right-hand 
panel of Figure 5 for a clear view).22 We therefore conclude:
RESULT 6: Dynamics once established are typically sticky and difficult to reverse 
with price controls.
III. Discussion
Much of the appeal of experiments lies in their capacity to surprise us. They 
often do this by providing us with evidence that intuitive theories can fail to predict 
behavior, but also by showing us that highly counterintuitive theories can succeed 
in predicting behavior. We have taken one of the more counterintuitive theoretical 
examples in economics and provided evidence that it precisely anticipates outcomes 
in laboratory markets. In the process, we have provided new evidence that Walrasian-
like dynamics govern price adjustment in general equilibrium environments.
Prices in our markets generally initiate outside of the economy’s conventional and 
equitable competitive equilibrium. When they do, as predicted, prices either explode 
or collapse to nearly zero, driven by nothing but dynamic forces set off by initial 
22 In online Appendix B we discuss the reversal phase in more detail and provide preliminary evidence suggesting 
that overtrading by the disadvantaged side of the market is a proximate cause of the failure of dynamics to reverse.
Figure 6. Average Share of Gains from Trade for Type 1 Subjects by Phase,  
Period within Phase, and Session
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
 2        4        6         8        10       12     14
Period 
Primary phase                                                      Reversal phase
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
 2             4             6             8            10
Period 
F
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 g
ai
ns
 c
ap
tu
re
d 
by
 ty
pe
 1
 
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
2
2
2
2
2 2
2 2
2
5 5
5
5 5
5 5
5 5
6 6 6
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
3
3
3
3
3
3
3 3
4
4 4
4
4
4 4 4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3 3
3
3
4
4
5
5 5 5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
7 7 7
7
7 7 7
7
7
2
2
2
2
8 8 8
8 8
8
8
8
8
Pos ED, control
Pos ED, free
Neg ED, control
Neg ED, free
Zero ED, free
ICE
F
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 g
ai
ns
 c
ap
tu
re
d 
by
 ty
pe
 1
 
3213CRoCkETT ET AL.: ExTREmE WALRAsIAN DyNAmICsVoL. 101 No. 7
prices. These forces continue to exert influence even at extreme prices, resulting 
eventually in one side of the market giving away its endowment for pennies and the 
other harvesting nearly all of the gains from exchange.
Although the extremity of the results seemed unlikely ex ante (at least to two of 
the authors), it comes about for ultimately economically sensible reasons. Indeed, 
the Walrasian dynamics driving our results are simply a general equilibrium ana-
logue of our standard textbook explanation of equilibration in simple supply and 
demand markets. Because of the Gale economy’s powerful income effects, prices 
greater than the interior CE induce buyers to demand more units than sellers are 
willing to supply. Buyers, scrambling to acquire scarce units, bid prices up and, 
because no fixed point exists to extinguish this process, prices continue moving ever 
upward.23 Symmetric arguments hold when prices begin below the interior equilib-
rium; low prices cause a glut of supply and drive prices downward in a process that 
ends only at prices near zero.
Chipman (1965) makes the case that the Gale example “is a special limiting 
case, and should not be taken too seriously as providing an illustration of any real 
situation.” While strictly speaking we agree, CES preferences can generate economies 
with multiple equilibria that have qualitatively similar but less extreme dynamics,24 
and we suspect that our basic findings concerning the character of Walrasian dynam-
ics are transferable to these more realistic (and more moderate) settings. Regardless, 
our interest in the Gale economy derives not from its realism but instead from the par-
ticular stress it imposes on Walrasian predictions. It is because nature rarely produces 
environments this tough that a laboratory test is particularly informative.
The implication of our research is that classical classifications of the stability 
of equilibria are empirically meaningful, even when markets are not cleared in a 
tatonnement institution, and even when the implications of stability classifications 
are quite extreme. We believe our paper, in conjunction with the handful of recent 
papers on the topic, represents a broad empirical vindication of much classical gen-
eral equilibrium theorizing on out-of-equilibrium dynamics.
Our paper advances a small prior literature on dynamics in economies with unsta-
ble interior equilibria. Anderson et al. (2004) and Hirota et al. (2005) study Scarf’s 
(1963) three-good economy which has a single, theoretically globally unstable inte-
rior equilibrium. They report evidence that this economy is indeed globally unstable; 
prices cycle about the equilibrium, as predicted by Walrasian dynamics, but do not 
converge to equilibrium during the three hour sessions. Indeed, Hirota et al. (2005) 
study parameterizations with theoretically divergent cycles and provide evidence 
that prices, in fact, move modestly away from the interior equilibrium over time. 
The first to demonstrate that income effects can produce market instability was Plott 
(2000), who examines two-good economies with downward sloping supply curves 
for the nonnumeraire good, generating multiple interior (in payoff space) equilibria. 
He reports evidence that Walrasian stability classifications are good predictors of 
convergence.25
23 Of course, in our discrete implementation the incentives to continue driving prices eventually go to zero.
24 See Chipman (2010) and Appendix Section A for more details.
25 Plott (2000) reports evidence in some sessions of prices converging to a stable equilibrium with a price 
of zero. In this price region of Plott’s economy, however, the traded commodity is actually an economic “bad” 
for sellers, who substantially improve their earnings relative to autarky by trading at a zero price (a net gain of 
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Like Anderson et al. (2004), our economy has a unique and unstable interior 
equilibrium, though like Plott (2000), a stable alternative equilibrium exists. Unlike 
both of these strands of work, the Gale example has two symmetric stable alterna-
tive equilibria, each deeply inegalitarian relative to the unstable interior alternative.  
On one hand substantial experimental evidence favoring Walrasian dynamics sug-
gests economies should equilibrate at these inegalitarian corner outcomes. On the 
other hand, there is a large experimental literature suggesting that, in part because 
of social preferences, egalitarian distributions tend to be focal, especially in ex ante 
symmetric environments like ours.  This evidence appeals to a compelling intuition 
that the interior but unstable outcome is more likely to emerge. Because the Gale 
environment pits Walrasian dynamics so strongly against intuitions (and evidence) 
regarding individuals’ preferences, it poses a considerably more strenuous test of 
Walrasian dynamics than previous work. Our results highlight in a particularly sharp 
way the fact that market dynamics are emergent phenomena and the outcomes deter-
mined are not direct objects of individual choice.  In the words of the eighteenth- 
century Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson (1767), the outcomes are “the result 
of human action but not … human design.”
Much work remains to be done in this area. A secondary result from our project 
(and Plott 2000) is that dynamics do not readily or reliably adapt to shocks to excess 
demand. Further investigation may illuminate the causes of sticky dynamics. As 
we point out in Section III, the special character of excess demand functions in the 
Gale example—excess demand increases as the economy approaches equilibrium—
makes it difficult to estimate the structural relationship between excess demand 
and price movements. High excess demand should induce faster price movement, 
but, here, high excess demand also coincides with diminishing marginal utility of 
consumption, possibly leading to slowdowns as prices approach corner equilibria. 
Studying less extreme, smooth variations on Marshall’s (1879) economy (using 
CES or quasi-linear preferences) would avoid this complication and might yield a 
quantitative characterization.
Finally, our experiment is designed to demonstrate the character and test the limits 
of dynamics. Our units of observations are market cohorts; strong interdependence 
between subject decisions and endogeneity of key variables limit us from saying 
much about individual decision making with much confidence. An important unex-
plored frontier is to use novel designs that exogenize excess demand (perhaps via 
carefully controlled shocks to endowments or preferences) within period to enable 
credible characterizations of how individual decision making operates in these 
markets.
Appendix: Theoretical Background and Details
A. optimality and stability for Gale’s (1963) Example
As discussed in Section IA, the expansion path for an agent in Gale’s economy 
is given by the equation y = ax − b for x, y ≥ 0. This ray is the locus of “corners” 
$3 per period). This stands in stark contrast to Gale’s economy, where agents give up all gains from trade as 
prices converge to zero or infinity.
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of the agent’s Leontief indifference curves, restricted to the feasible set. An agent’s 
budget constraint is given by the equation p  w x +  w y = px + y . An agent’s optimal 
consumption bundle ( x * ,  y * ) is given by the intersection of his expansion path and 
budget constraint, provided the intersection occurs in the feasible set. If this inter-
section implies negative consumption, the agent’s optimal bundle is (0, p  w x +  w y ) 
if b < 0, and (( p  w x +  w y )/p, 0) if b > 0. Focusing on interior solutions, we have 
  x * =  p w x +  w y + b  __ a + p  ,
  y * =  a( p  w x +  w y ) − pb  __ a + p  .
By Walras’s Law, we need only consider the excess demand for good x . Individual 
excess demand is given by  x * −  w x = m/(a + p), where m =  w y + b − a w x , so 
aggregate excess demand is given by the equation 
  Z x ( p) =   m 1  _  a 1 + p +  
 m 2  _  a 2 + p .
Assuming an interior, positive competitive equilibrium price exists (which is the 
case in our experiment parameterization by construction), we have 
  p * = −  a 1 m 2 +  a 2 m 1   _  m 1 +  m 2   .
For instability, we need  Z x ′ ( p) > 0 when evaluated at  p * . (Note that excess demand 
returns to zero as p approaches infinity, regardless of whether the interior competi-
tive equilibrium is stable.) The derivative of excess demand with respect to p is 
  Z x ′ ( p) = −  m 1  _  ( a 1 + p) 2  −  
 m 2  _  ( a 2 + p) 2  .
Evaluating  Z x ′ at the interior equilibrium price, we have 
  Z x ′ (  p * ) = −   m 1  __ [  m 1 ( a 1 −  a 2 )    m 1 +  m 2   ] 2  −  
 m 2  __ 
 [  m 2 ( a 2 −  a 1 )    m 1 +  m 2   ] 2  
 = −  (  m 1 +  m 2  _ a 1 −  a 2   ) 2 ( 1 _  m 1  +  1 _  m 2  )
 = −   ( m 1 +  m 2 ) 3   __   m 1  m 2 ( a 1 −  a 2 ) 2  .
Thus  Z x ′ ( p * ) > 0 if and only if 
  
 ( m 1 +  m 2 ) 3  _ m 1 m 2   < 0.
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Note from the aggregate excess demand equation that if  m 1 m 2 > 0 there does not 
exist an interior competitive equilibrium, because the sign of excess demand does 
not vary with price. Since we are restricting our attention to economies with at least 
one interior equilibrium, so that  m 1 m 2 < 0 by construction, the instability condition 
is met if and only if  m 1 +  m 2 > 0.
Intuitively, this instability condition implies that agents have a relative preference 
for “home production.” This is most readily seen in the case of corner endowments. 
If agent 2 (1) is endowed only with good y (x), then  m 2 > 0 and  m 1 < 0. Fixing  m 2 , 
we need  m 1 sufficiently small to obtain instability, which in turn requires  a 1 to be suf-
ficiently small (an agent’s relative preference for x is decreasing in a). Graphically, if 
the endowment is near the lower-right (upper-left) corner of the Edgeworth box, for 
instability we need the expansion path for agent 1 to be flatter (steeper) than agent 2’s.
Gale (1963) adopts the following parameter values: 
  a 1 =  1 _ 2 ,  a 2 = 2,  b 1 =  b 2 = 0,  w 1 x =  w 2 y = 1 −  w 1 y = 1 −  w 2 x = 1
 ⇒  p * = 1,  m 1 = − 1 _ 2 ,  m 2 = 1,  m 1 +  m 2 =  1 _ 2 ,
hence, the instability result. Gale notes that if the endowments are switched, stabil-
ity is obtained: 
  w 1 x =  w 2 y = 1 −  w 1 y = 1 −  w 2 x = 0
 ⇒  p * = 1,  m 1 = 1,  m 2 = − 2,  m 1 +  m 2 = − 1.
In the present paper, we adopt the following parameter values: 
  a 1 =  1 _ 0.028167 ≈ 35.5,  a 2 =  1 _ 0.00152 ≈ 658, 
  b 1 = − 38 _ 0.028167 ≈ −1,349,  b 2 =  6 _ 0.00152 ≈ 3,947,
  w 1 x = 15,  w 1 y = 400,  w 2 x = 5,  w 2 y = 5,600
 ⇒  p * = 158,  m 1 ≈ − 1,482,  m 2 = 6,258,  m 1 +  m 2 = 4,776,
which implies the interior competitive equilibrium is unstable. Excess demand is 
drawn in Figure A1.
B. A Broader Theoretical Framework for Gale’s Example
Gale’s example features extreme disequilibrium price paths, but the underlying 
assumption that goods are perfect complements in consumption is not necessary 
to produce qualitatively similar dynamics. The Gale example can be viewed as the 
limiting case of a considerably broader set of smooth exchange economies.
Marshall (1879, p. 30) drew the diagram reproduced in Figure A2. This is a net 
trade diagram for a two-agent, two-good pure exchange economy, where the current 
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endowment is located at the origin. The (net) offer curve for England is labeled E, 
and Germany’s is labeled G. In the example, England will sell good x and Germany 
will sell good y; thus, any point H = ( H x ,  H y ) reflects a net trade of (− H x , + H y ) for 
England and (+ H x , − H y ) for Germany. The points A, B, and C each represent equi-
librium net trades. If we let good y be the numeraire and p(H ) be the price of good 
x implied by net trade H, then p(A) > p(B) > p(C).
Marshall claims that B is locally unstable, while A and C are locally stable. His 
argument uses what we now call Marshallian (as opposed to Walrasian) adjust-
ment. Consider net trade proposal P, as labeled in Figure A2. To import  P x units of x, 
Germany is not willing to pay a price greater than p(Q) < p(P) , so it is willing only 
to export fewer than  P y units of y. Similarly, to import  P y units of y, England is willing 
to accept a price as low as p(R) < p(P) , so it is willing to export more than  P x units 
of x. Thus, a new proposal H is made such that  H x >  P x and  H y <  P y (this proposal 
will occur in the region delineated by arrows in the diagram). Marshall argues that this 
process of allocation adjustment converges to net trade C. A similar story applies to 
net trade proposals in the region between A and B , which eventually converge to A.
Walrasian adjustment also implies the stability of A and C (and the instability 
of B). Consider price p(Q). At this price, Germany’s net demand for good x,  Q x , is 
less than England’s net supply of good x, a quantity near  R x . Since aggregate excess 
demand at p(Q) is negative, the price is adjusted downward, eventually converging 
to p(C) and net trade C.
Offer curves similar to those drawn by Marshall in Figure A2 can be derived from 
CES or quasi-linear utility functions. For the CES function u(x,y) = (α x  ρ + β  y  ρ ) 1/ρ , 
Chipman (1965) provides a necessary condition for instability (and thus multiple 
equilibria), namely, ρ < 0, which is intuitive considering that ρ = 1 represents 
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perfect substitutes, the limit as ρ approaches zero represents Cobb-Douglas prefer-
ences, and the limit as ρ approaches minus infinity represents the Leontief prefer-
ences we study in our experiment.26 Analogous to our stability condition in the Gale 
example (i.e.,  m 1 +  m 2 > 0), instability for CES preferences generally also requires 
a taste for “home production” (e.g., England, the “exporter” of good x in Marshall’s 
example, needs a relatively high α, and Germany a relatively high β).
Now, consider Marshall’s economy as parameterized by CES preferences. 
Increasing the degree to which goods are complements (that is, decreasing ρ) moves 
the stable equilibrium allocations toward the axes of the net trade diagram, so that 
p(A) increases, p(C) decreases, and the gains from trade in these equilibria become 
more asymmetric. Gale’s example is the limiting case where goods are perfect com-
plements (i.e., the limit as ρ → ∞). The unstable interior equilibrium survives as 
the only fixed point where markets clear: supply of x exceeds demand whenever 
p < p(B), pushing prices ever downward, while demand exceeds supply whenever 
p > p(B), pushing prices ever upward. At a “corner” price of zero or infinity, the sign 
of aggregate excess demand is still nonzero but prices can move no further. When 
p = 0 (∞), England (Germany) gives away good x (y) for free, while Germany 
(England) takes at least enough of it to satisfy its own demand but not so much so 
26 Chipman (2010) provides a tighter necessary condition for instability (namely, ρ < 1 ) under the assump-
tion that the CES economy is “supersymmetric” (i.e., endowments and preferences for the two agents are mirror 
images). Theodore C. Bergstrom, Ken-Ichi Shimomura, and Takehiko Yamato (2009) study conditions for multiple 
equilibria in two-agent, two-good economies with quasi-linear preferences.
Figure A2. Marshall’s (1879) Economy
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as to exceed England’s (Germany’s) supply. Such outcomes constitute competitive 
equilibria of a strange sort, where all of the gains from trade accrue to one side of 
the market, the beneficiary determined entirely by the initial price.
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